The European Story: Through Struggle to Unity

The European Story: Through Struggle to Unity

By Bartosz Skitał 

Illustration by Zofia Jankowska

For most people reading this article the idea of 20 years must feel like a lifetime, especially if they were born around that same time. Even though we as a human species require much more time to evolve in any way, there are plenty of aspects of our daily lives that change dynamically and influence the way we think, behave, and interact. It naturally follows that such changes would be even more drastic were they to be analysed over an especially long period of time, even if restricted to, say, a certain region. That being said, let us examine the European story over the past two decades. 

The year 2004 marked a significant milestone for the European Union, as May 1st was the time of the largest accession of new member states since the Union’s establishment in 1993, with only three more states joining at a later date. It was a massive growth in a community that is guided by the same aims and values regarding equality, security, development, and improvement of the shared economy (European Union, 2024). As luck would have it, the established economic and social cohesion was put to a test not long afterwards. 

Following the events of the U.S. financial crisis, the Eurozone experienced one of its own. Other factors, such as property bubbles (irrationally elevated prices bound to crash) and poor fiscal policies of several EU countries, further contributed to the worsening situation of the peripheral member states (Pilbeam 2023). The crisis was set off by the collapse of Iceland’s banking system in 2008, followed by debt crises across Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, often abbreviated as PIIGS, who were unable to repay their government debt without external assistance (ECB, 2022). Among the most heavily impacted was Greece, where the budget deficit was discovered to have been significantly underreported, and which received the largest bailout packages in 2010 and 2012 financed by other members of the European Monetary Union and the International Monetary Fund (Pilbeam, 2023). The crisis severely fuelled the uncertainty regarding the durability of the EU, contributing to the rising euroscepticism across the continent, which, however, was yet to peak. 

In 2016, the United Kingdom held a public referendum whose outcome was to leave the EU. Though the Eurozone crisis played a significant role in the campaigns of parties aiming to leave the Union, the voters’ decision was also impacted by the negative prospects connected with the EU regarding matters of immigration, terrorism, job market, and Britain’s sovereignty (Clarke et al., 2017). The vote shocked the economy as investors started moving their assets, causing the British pound to hit the lowest point against the dollar since 1985 (MacroTrends, 2024). Those events sprung fear across the EU that other member states may follow in Britain’s footsteps – a situation that would lead to a possible collapse of a structure created over decades with few other goals than the, apparently, fleeting unity in mind. But was the issue of the disenchantment with the Union a universal one, or does it align with a certain side of the political spectrum? 

As was the case with the Brexit referendum voters (Clarke et al., 2017), euroscepticism is not more prominent on one side of the political spectrum than on the other in the rest of Europe either. Though left- and right-wing ideology can sometimes align themselves in the opposition to the EU, the nature of the practiced euroscepticism differs and it covers multiple dimensions. Citizens may oppose the EU on one matter, but not on another. Van Elsas (2017) distinguishes between dissatisfaction with the current state of the Union, which tends to be the issue among left-wing supporters, and opposition to the strengthening of the Union, which right-wing supporters tend to focus on. Another difference exists in motivation for euroscepticism among the two groups. While left-wing citizens’ dissatisfaction with the present state of the EU comes from support for redistribution, their socio-economic views do not affect their opinion on further integration, nor is it impaired by their cultural attitudes, which tend to be associated with international solidarity and multiculturalism. For right-wing supporters, on the other hand, cultural attitudes are often anchored in nationalism, and therefore greatly differ from the left-wing views. In consequence, the right-wing views tend to be less ambivalent in both dimensions, thus producing more categorical opposition. Could this suggest that polarisation is as crucial of a problem in matters other than euroscepticism? 

It is commonly thought that rising political polarisation is a growing issue, however research suggests this problem is, again, not one-dimensional. Van der Veen (2021) differentiates between two types of political polarisation, affective – concerning the emotional distance from opposing political groups – and ideological – the degree of differentiation among political parties on the political spectrum. Moreover, he further differentiates between the level on which polarisation occurs, that is elite polarisation, referring to political figures, and mass polarisation, referring to polarisation among ordinary citizens. The analysis across all of those dimensions suggests that while affective and ideological elite polarisation seem to both have been on the rise in recent years, the trend among the masses indicates decreasing polarisation. Different predictions exist as for the future trends regarding polarisation, though the most likely one suggests that mass polarisation will follow the rise in elite polarisation due to political figures’ impact on society. The ideological influence, however, is not one-sided, and the elites should also respond to the public positions. But what positions would those be? 

Since the 2016 UK referendum, followed by the actual Brexit in 2020, speculations over the possible departures of other member states have fallen just as quickly as they had arisen. Especially early after the referendum, Brexit was seen more as a cautionary tale rather than an example to follow, as Europeans have turned to voting in favour of pro-EU reforms and parties (Wind, 2017). As of 2024, no other country has left the Union, quite the opposite – there are nine candidate states awaiting accession, supporting the expansion of the EU. Moreover, majority of member (and non-member) countries’ citizens think favourably of the Union, some even bridging the gap in numbers between left- and right-wing supporters (Blazina, 2024). Such results obviously could not arise out of nowhere. 

Having recovered from the Eurozone crisis, the European Union is equipped with better economic tools than ever before. The euro is backed by the well-governed and credible European Central Bank with greater regulatory powers and supervision, which is successfully tackling its pre-set goals for inflation and economic growth following the recent Covid-19 crisis. The Banking Union and Capital Markets Union initiatives aim to further integrate European financial institutions and strengthen the euro as it is growing in popularity as an alternative to the dollar in international investments (Pilbeam, 2023). And though aiming to prosper economically, the EU does not remain partial to environmental issues.  

Over the years many measures concerned with preserving the environment have been implemented by the European Union. Firstly, the gradual move towards a circular economy targeting the products’ life cycle, as well as an improvement of waste management and the market for secondary raw materials, would improve the value and longevity of resources utilised (European Commission, 2024). Moreover, the more ambitious plans include the transition to a climate-neutral economy by 2050 – the Sustainable Industry Low Carbon initiative – through the transformation of the energy and manufacturing sectors, as well as the increase of the competitiveness of the net-zero technology sector and improvement of the market for sustainable technology – the Net-Zero Industry Act (European Commission, 2024). 

The strengthening and development of the European Union across many aspects in spite of the hurdles along the way is a display of grate resilience. As a political structure connecting nations in far more than a single goal it is not easy to maintain, let alone govern towards prosperity. But if the past two decades are any indication, Europe will remain united and stronger with each year. 

References: 

EU countries (2024) European Union. https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/eu-countries_en 

Aims and values (2024) European Union https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values_en 

Pilbeam, K. (2023). International Finance. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-3503-4710-6 

Hobelsberger, K., Kok, C., & Mogelli, F. P. (2022). A tale of three crises: synergies between ECB tasks. In ECB. Retrieved November 3, 2024, from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op305~f9d43bd762.en.pdf 

Clarke, H. D., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Voting to Leave. In Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union (pp. 146–174). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Pound Dollar Exchange Rate (GBP USD) – historical chart. MacroTrends. Retrieved November 3, 2024, from https://www.macrotrends.net/2549/pound-dollar-exchange-rate-historical-chart 

van Elsas, E. J. (2017). Opposing a different Europe: The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens in Western Europe. ISBN 978-94-91602-84-9 

Van Der Veen, O. (2022). Political polarisation compared: creating the comparative political polarisation index. European Political Science, 22(2), 260–280. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-022-00400-x 

Wind, M. (2017). Brexit and euroscepticism. In Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811763.003.0011 

Blazina, C. (2024, July 23). People broadly view the EU favorably, both in member states and elsewhere. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/10/24/people-broadly-view-the-eu-favorably-both-in-member-states-and-elsewhere/ 

Sustainability. (n.d.). Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability_en 

Climate-neutral economy. (2024). Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/climate-neutral-economy_en 

The Net-Zero Industry Act. (n.d.). Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/net-zero-industry-act_en 

Bartosz Skitał is an Economics student at UvA with growing interest in researching human behaviour in economic context. He is also very passionate about music and often spends his free time exploring the art and its culture, as well as improving his guitar playing and overall composition and production skills. For Inter, Bartosz is a quality controller as well as a writing editor.

Zofia Jankowska is a third year Product Design student at the Bydgoszcz University of Science and Technology. In her studies she’s most interested in furniture and graphic design – creating labels and packagings. Zofia enjoys everything creative: photography, drawing her own characters, sewing clothes, making jewelery or colorful makeup.
You can find her projects at @zjankowskadesign

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